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The Eurosystem has stated its intention to reformulate important aspects of
its operational framework. Subject to change are inter alia the maturity of the
main reﬁnancing operations and the timing of the reserve maintenance period.
This paper presents a model to analyze banks’ behaviour in the European
money market. Its main result is that the suggested alterations are sensible,
but that further improvements should be undertaken. The model captures
the main elements of current the operational framework for monetary policy
of the Eurosystem. It is shown that expectations of interest rate changes may
lead to extreme under- and overbidding behaviour in the main reﬁnancing
operations and to wildly diﬀering provisions of required reserves across a given
reserve maintenance period. The resulting problems can be avoided if ﬁrst, no
overlapping of the maturities of the main reﬁnancing operations is allowed -
which corresponds to the suggestion of the ECB - and second, if the required
reserves are not remunerated at an average rate.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E58, G21
Keywords: bank behaviour, European Central Bank, monetary policy instruments,
market for reserves
¤Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Department of Economics, 06099 Halle/Saale,
Germany, Tel.: +49/345/552 33 33, Fax.: +49/345/552 71 90, email: neyer@wiwi.uni-halle.de
11 Introduction
The Eurosystem1 wants to change important aspects of its operational framework.
Two signiﬁcant proposed changes are the shortening of the maturity of the main
reﬁnancing operations and the changing of the timing of the reserve maintenance
period. The rationale for changing the operational framework is to reduce the impact
of interest rate expectations on the banks’ bidding behaviour in the main reﬁnancing
operations. Expectations of interest rate changes have led to severe under- and
overbidding behaviour in the main reﬁnancing operations.2
This paper shows within a theoretical framework, that the proposed alterations go
into the right direction but that a further improvement would be not to remunerate
reserve requirements at an average rate. The main results of this paper are that
under the current operational framework of the Eurosystem, there may be
² under- and overbidding in the main reﬁnancing operations,
² extreme uneven provisions of required reserves, and
² a violation of the Eurosystem’s principal of equal treatment of all credit insti-
tutions independently of their size or where they are located,3
and that these problems could be avoided
² if the maturities of the main reﬁnancing operations did not overlap, and
² if minimum reserves were not remunerated at an average rate.
The ﬁrst aspect corresponds with the suggestion of the ECB. The second is a further
alteration, which seems to be sensible, because it refrains the ECB from its self-
commitment to change interest rates once a month only.
Related literature can be divided into three categories. The ﬁrst category consists of
empirical and theoretical papers analyzing explicitly causes and problems of the euro
1The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) comprises the ECB and the national central
banks of all EU Member States. For this reason, the term “Eurosystem” has been chosen to
describe the institution being responsible for monetary policy in the euro area, namely the ECB
and the national central banks in the euro area (ECB 2001b).
2For details concerning the intended alterations see ECB (2002b).
3For a description of general requirements, principles and objectives behind the design of the
Eurosystem’s operational framework see Issing and Gaspar (2001, p. 112-113) and ECB (2001b,
p. 59-60).
2area banks’ over- and underbidding behaviour in the main reﬁnancing operations
(see, for example, Ayuso and Repullo 2000, 2001, Nautz and Oechssler 2001). This
paper adds to this debate by showing that under the current operational framework
of the Eurosystem the observed over- and underbidding behaviour may be due to
market expectations of interest rate changes and that a consequence of this bidding
behaviour may be a violation of the above mentioned Eurosystem’s principal of equal
treatment. The second category describes the reserve management of European
banks (Nautz 1998). The model of this paper describing banks’ behaviour in the
money market of the euro area distinguishes from Nautz (1998) by incorporating
minimum reserves and considering explicitly speciﬁc features of the main reﬁnancing
operations as overlapping maturities for example. Furthermore, in this paper an
isolated bank is considered, whereas Nautz (1998) considers a representative bank,
which implies that the interbank money market plays no role in his analysis, whereas
in this paper this market is important. The third category consists of empirical
and theoretical papers analyzing the money market in the US, explaining banks’
reserve management and/or the observed behaviour of the federal funds rate (see, for
example, Campbell 1987, Hamilton 1996, Clouse and Dow 1999, 2002, Furﬁne 2000,
Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati 2001, 2002). In the ﬁrst place, this paper distinguishes
from those papers capturing speciﬁc institutional aspects of the money market in
the euro area.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some insti-
tutional background on the main reﬁnancing operations and the minimum reserve
system of the Eurosystem. Furthermore, information concerning under- and overbid-
ding behaviour and the fulﬁllment of required reserves are given. Section 3 models a
bank’s behaviour under the current operational framework of the Eurosystem. Sec-
tion 4 illustrates a bank’s behaviour under a modiﬁed framework. Section 5 gives a
short summary and concludes the paper.
2 The Main Reﬁnancing Operations and the Min-
imum Reserve System of the Eurosystem
The Main Reﬁnancing Operations and Under- and Overbidding
The main reﬁnancing operations are the key instrument of the Eurosystem to provide
liquidity to the banking sector in the euro area. Banks’ liquidity needs and therefore,
3their demand for reserves, mainly arise from two factors: reserve requirements and
autonomous factors, as banknotes in circulation and government balances at central
banks. The reserve requirements roughly account for 54 %, the net autonomous
factors for 45 % of the overall liquidity needs of the banking system (ECB 2002a).
These liquidity needs are satisﬁed by the Eurosystem as follows. Roughly 74 % are
met through the main reﬁnancing operations, 26 % through long-term reﬁnancing
operations and less than 1 % through the marginal lending facility and ﬁne tuning
operations (ECB 2002b). This points out the outstanding signiﬁcance of the main
reﬁnancing operations in the ECB’s tool box. Therefore, the focus of this paper is
on these operations. The main reﬁnancing operations are collateralized credit trans-
actions with a weekly frequency and a maturity of two weeks. They are executed
either in form of a ﬁxed rate or a variable rate tender.4 Credit operations with
the Eurosystem have to be based on adequate collateral. In the tender procedures,
the bids themselves do not have to be covered by adequate collateral, but only the
allotted amount (ECB 1999). The Eurosystem has deﬁned eligible assets, which can
serve as collateral.5 Although diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure across Member
States of the EMU have been considered when deﬁning the list of eligible assets,
the availability of and the marginal costs for collateral vary between the countries
within the euro-area (H¨ am¨ al¨ ainen 2000).
In the past, several main reﬁnancing operations have been characterized by severe
under- and overbidding. Overbidding occurs if the aggregate bidding amount ex-
ceeds signiﬁcantly the benchmark allotment, which reﬂects fairly well actual liquidity
needs of the banking sector (see ECB 2002a for details), and vice versa for under-
bidding. Extreme overbidding could be observed under ﬁxed rate tender, extreme
underbidding under both tender procedures. Overbidding under the ﬁxed rate ten-
der can be gauged by an allotment quota (amount allotted divided by the total
amount of bids), which was on average about 3 %, and in all tenders less than 7
%. In May 2000, the quota even dropped below than 1 %. Auctions characterized
by an extreme underbidding behaviour were conducted in April 1999, in February
2001, in April 2001 and in October 2001. The bids in these auctions did not allow
the ECB to allot the amount of reserves according to the actual liquidity needs.6
4For a detailed description of the main reﬁnancing operations and the other monetary policy
instruments of the ECB see, for example, ECB (2000a, 2001b, 2002c).
5For details see for example ECB (2002a, p. 38-50).
6For a detailed description of the banks’ bidding behaviour in the main reﬁnancing operations
4Problems resulting from the extreme bidding behaviour are seen in a violation
of the Eurosystem’s guiding principle of equal treatment of ﬁnancial institutions
(H¨ am¨ al¨ ainen 2000, Ayuso and Repullo 2000), an ineﬃcient allocation of ﬁnancial
resources, wrong signals to the market participants about the stance of monetary
policy, an unnecessary risk taking by banks, and the non-existence of information in
the bids about the actual liquidity needs of the banking sector (Nautz and Oechssler
2001, Ehrhart 2001).7 This paper adds to the debate by showing theoretically that
the Eurosytem’s principal of equal treatment may be violated under the current
operational framework.
Causes of the observed under- and overbidding behaviour are seen, e.g. in a false
rationing scheme in case the bids for reserves exceed the amount of reserves the ECB
is willing to allot (Nautz and Oechssler 2001) and in a possible asymmetric objective
function of the ECB (Ayuso and Repullo 2000, 2001). This paper agrees with the
ECB (2000a and 2001a). It shows that under the current operational framework
of the Eurosystem the observed over- and underbidding behaviour is due to market
expectations of interest rate changes.
The reaction of the ECB to avoid this undesired bidding behaviour has been three-
fold. First, in June 2000, the Governing Council decided to switch from ﬁxed rate
tenders to variable rate tenders as a response to the severe overbidding (ECB 2000b).
(From the launch of the euro in January 1999 until June 2000, tenders were con-
ducted exclusively as ﬁxed rate tenders. Since then, only variable rate tenders with
a minimum bid rate have been used.) Second, in November 2001, the Governing
Council decided to discuss interest rate changes at its ﬁrst meeting of a month only,
because discussing this issue at both of the bi-monthly meetings would lead every
two weeks to speculations about interest rate changes (Duisenberg 2001). However,
these are not convincing solutions to he under- and overbidding problem. If the ECB
refrains totally from using a variable rate tender, only the overbidding problem will
be solved, and the ECB will give up an instrument which might be the most appro-
priate one in speciﬁc situations. If the ECB reverts to ﬁxed rate tenders, under- and
overbidding may occur again. The decision to take interest rate decisions normally
during the Governing Council’s ﬁrst meeting of a month only, does not solve the
from January 1999 until September 2001 see ECB (2001a).
7Concerning the information aspect of auctions used as a monetary policy instrument, see also
Nautz (1997).
5problem either, but simply reduces its incidence and the Eurosystem’s ﬂexibility
concerning monetary policy decisions. However, the third reaction of the ECB, the
proposed changes in its operational framework, goes into the right direction. If they
are implemented, the incentive to under- or overbid will be reduced, since expecta-
tions of interest rate changes do not inﬂuence banks’ bidding behaviour any more.
But a problem remains that the ECB commits itself to make interest rate decisions
once a month only.
This paper shows that under- and overbidding can be avoided if no overlapping of
the maturities of the main reﬁnancing operations is allowed - which corresponds to
the suggestion of the ECB - and second, if the required reserves are not remunerated
at an average rate. The latter would refrain the ECB from its commitment to make
interest rate decision once a month only.
The Minimum Reserve System
and Uneven Provisions of Required Reserves
In the euro-area, banks are required to hold compulsory deposits on the accounts
with the Eurosystem. At present, the minimum reserves amount to 2 % of certain
short-term liability items of the balance sheets of the credit institutions. For deter-
mining required reserves, the stock of short-term liabilities at the end of a month is
considered. The minimum reserve maintenance period starts on the 24th calender
day of the next month and ends on the 23th calender day of the then following
month. Consequently, during a maintenance period, generally a bank does not face
uncertainty about the amount of required reserves.8 For fulﬁllment of the reserve
requirements, banks can make use of averaging provisions. The requirements are
fulﬁlled if the average of the end-of-calendar-day balances on a bank’s reserve ac-
count over a one-month maintenance period corresponds to the required amount.
Holdings of required reserves are remunerated at the average, over the maintenance
period, of the ECB’s rate on the main reﬁnancing operations. Remuneration is paid
after the respective maintenance period.9 On the aggregate level, the ECB prefers
smooth provisions of reserve requirements, since it enhances the buﬀer function of
8Until 1998, this was the case in the United States, where only on the last two days of the
maintenance period did a bank know its reserve requirement with certainty (see Furﬁne (2000) for
example
9For a detailed description of the minimum reserve system see for example ECB (2000a, 2001b,
2002c).
6reserve holdings against liquidity shocks (ECB 2002a). However, under the cur-
rent operational framework banks have an incentive to provide reserve requirements
extremely unevenly across a maintenance period in speciﬁc situations. A good illus-
tration of extreme uneven provisions is the maintenance period January/February
2001. Figure 1 shows that in that period, required reserves were 120 billion euro
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Figure 1: Deposits on Current Accounts and Required Reserves in the Reserve
Maintenance Period January/February 2001. Data: ECB.
This paper shows that under the current operational framework of the Eurosystem
extreme unequal provisions of required reserves are due to incentives triggered by
expectations of interest rate changes. Furthermore, the paper points out that under
the above suggested modiﬁcations of the operational framework the problem of
extreme uneven provisions of required reserves can be avoided.
3 A Bank’s Demand for Reserves under the
Current Operational Framework of the Eu-
rosystem
The aim of this section is to develop a model explaining a banks’s behaviour in
the European money market under the current operational framework of the Eu-
rosystem. Therefore, the following model captures the key features of the European
money market, described partly in the previous section. Within a two-period model,
a bank has to decide on the allocation of its minimum reserve holdings and its bidding
7amounts in the tender procedures conducted by the central bank so that its total
liquidity costs are minimized. First, these total liquidity costs are derived. Then,
the optimization problem is solved under certainty, where there are no changes in
interest rates. Finally, the problem is solved under uncertainty. There are expec-
tations of interest rate changes, and it is analyzed how the bank’s optimal reserve
management and bidding behaviour changes in this case.
3.1 Liquidity Costs
There are two time periods, t = 1;2. These two periods cover a reserve maintenance
period. A risk-neutral, isolated, price taking bank is considered, which needs liq-
uidity for covering given autonomous factors A and given reserve requirements RR
imposed by a central bank. Concerning required reserves, the bank can make use of





with Rt ¸ 0 being the reserve holdings in t.
To cover its liquidity needs, the bank can borrow from the central bank. For bor-
rowing from the central bank, the bank can bid for reserves in a ﬁxed rate tender10
at the beginning of each period t. Kt, with Kt ¸ 0, denotes the amount a bank bids
for. ktKt is the actual amount being allotted, with 0 < kt · 1. Credit operations
executed at the beginning of t = 1 have a maturity of two periods. Consequently,
credit operations carried out in diﬀerent periods have overlapping maturities. The
stock of credits in t borrowed from the central bank is given by
RKt = kt¡1Kt¡1 + ktKt; (2)








with the parameters qi;q > 0. Equation 3 shows that the bank faces increasing
marginal collateralization costs. This equation reﬂects that the “... availability
10The basic results of this paper can be transferred to variable rate tenders.
8of collateral and the cost of holding collateral diﬀer considerably across Member
States...” (H¨ am¨ al¨ ainen 2000), since it is assumed that the parameter qi is bank
speciﬁc.
In the euro area, a bank cannot only cover its liquidity needs by borrowing from the
Eurosystem, but alternatively it can borrow reserves in the interbank money market,
where it can also place excess liquidity. This aspect is incorporated in this model
by the following equations. In the interbank money market, the bank can demand
credit or place excess liquidity at the beginning of each period. All operations in
the money market have a maturity of one period. The bank’s net position in the
interbank market is
IBt = A + Rt ¡ RKt: (4)
A key function of the interbank market is to balance the banks’ daily ﬂuctuations of
liquidity needs. In this model, this interbank market function could be considered
by modelling the autonomous factors A as a random variable or by adding shocks.
However, this would make the analysis more complicated without changing the main
results. Therefore, we take the interbank market as a pure alternative source for
covering liquidity needs to a credit from the central bank. This implies that on
an aggregate level, there must be banks bidding for more reserves than they need
to cover their own liquidity needs. This is the case in the euro area, where only
a fraction of all banks actually takes part in the main reﬁnancing operations.11






with the parameter z > 0. This approach can be compared with the common
approach of modelling the liquidity role of reserves, which posits that banks in-
cur increasing costs when liquidity deviates from a target level (see, for example,
Campbell 1987 and Bartolini et al 2001). In this paper, the quadratic form reﬂects
increasing marginal costs of searching for banks with matching liquidity needs and
those resulting from the need to split large transactions into many small ones to
work around credit lines (compare Bartolini et al 2001).
11At the end of 2000 for example, 2,542 credit institutions in the euro area fulﬁlled the criteria
for participating in the main reﬁnancing operations, but in 1999 and 2000 the total number of
institutions which actually took part in these operations ﬂuctuated between 400 and 600 (ECB
2001b, p. 63).
9Deﬁning lt as the interest rate the bank has to pay for a credit from the central
bank, and et as the interbank money market rate, total liquidity costs in period t
are given by
Ct(Kt¡1;Kt;Rt) = kt¡1Kt¡1lt¡1 + ktKtlt + IBtet
+ Qt + Zt ¡ RR(lt + lt¡1)I[t=2]: (6)
The ﬁrst row presents interest payments to the central bank and net interest
payments resulting from transactions in the interbank market. The second row
reﬂects collateral and transactions costs, and the remuneration of required reserves.
The latter are remunerated at the average, over the maintenance period, of the
central bank’s rate on its credit operations. The indicator function I[¢] takes a value
of 1 when t = 2, and 0 otherwise, reﬂecting that interests are paid at the end of the
maintenance period.
3.2 Optimization under Certainty
The bank wants to minimize its liquidity costs across the maintenance period, while
keeping average reserves over the maintenance period to the required level RR.
Disregarding discounting, whose impact is negligible over this short horizon, the









The bank faces a dynamic optimization problem, because the amount the bank
borrows from the central bank in the ﬁrst period has an important impact on the
decisions made during the subsequent period. Deﬁning Vt as the associated value




fC1(K1;R1) + V2(RK1(K1);R1)jR1 ¸ 0;K1 ¸ 0g; (8)
subject to equation 1. This optimization problem is solved backwards, so that ﬁrst
V2(RK1(K1);R1) = min
K2
fC2(RK1(K1);R1;K2)jK2 ¸ 0g (9)
10is determined.12 Before solving this optimization problem, the following assumptions
concerning interest rates are made. The rate on central bank’s credit operations is
lt = l1 8t: (10)
This means that there is no monetary impulse in form of interest rate changes. The
interest rate in the interbank market is given by
et = lt + u; (11)
with u > 0. The mark-up u reﬂects that only credits with the central bank have to
be collateralized.
Optimal Bidding Behaviour in the Second Period






¡ k2u = 0: (12)
The ﬁrst order condition shows that expected marginal costs of covering liquidity
needs at the central bank and in the money market must be equal. Solving this




k2(q+z) > 0 if qi < q
i;crit
2







2 = u + z(A + 2RR ¡ R1 ¡ k1K1): (14)
For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that A + Rt ¡ kt¡1Kt¡1 > 0 8 t. This
means that the bank has to demand for liquidity in each period. In t, the credit
from the central bank kt¡1Kt¡1 is not suﬃcient for covering the bank’s total liquidity
needs. Equation 13 shows that just in case qi < q
i;crit
2 the bank takes part in the
tender procedures at the central bank, otherwise it prefers to cover its total liquidity
needs in the interbank market. (Ties are broken in favour of covering liquidity needs
in the interbank market.)
12Due to equation 1 R2 is replaced by 2RR ¡ R1 so that minimization is over K2 only.
11Knowing the optimal value of K2, and therefore V2(RK1(K1);R1), equation 8 can
be solved, i. e. the optimal bidding behaviour and the optimal reserve management
in the ﬁrst period can be determined, whereas between two scenarios have to be
distinguished: high collateral costs (qi ¸ q
i;crit
2 ) and low collateral costs (qi < q
i;crit
2 ).
Optimal Bidding Behaviour and Optimal Reserve Management in the
First Period


















Equations 15 and 16 show that optimal bidding behaviour and optimal management
of reserve holdings does not only demand marginal costs to be equal from bidding in
the tender procedures and transactions in the interbank market, but that addition-
ally intertemporal optimality has to be considered. Equations 15 and 16 allow us to
determine the optimal values for K1 and R1 and therefore, R1 ¡ R2. The optimal




k1q(2q+5z) > 0 if qi < q
i;crit
2




Equation ?? makes clear that the bank either bids in both or no period. This result
is due to the increasing marginal bidding costs. If K1 = K2 = 0, R1 = RR+0:5k0K0.
Inserting these expressions into equation 14 reveals that the critical value for biding
in the tender procedures is
q
i;crit = u + z(A + RR ¡ 0:5k0K0): (18)
This result is plausible. It says that the critical value for the collateralization costs
will be higher, the higher the costs for covering liquidity in the interbank market
(u and z) and liquidity needs (A + RR ¡ 0:5k0K0). The latter results from the
increasing marginal collateralization costs.
12Furthermore, equation 17 implies that the bank bids for more reserves than it actu-
ally needs to cover its own liquidity needs (K1 > (A + R1 ¡ k0K0)=k1) to place this
excess liquidity in the interbank market if qi < (5=3)u¡(2=3)q(A+RR¡0:5k0K0).








q(A + RR ¡ 0:5k0K0): (19)
Equation 19 shows that qi;crit will be higher the higher interest earnings in the
interbank market compared to interest payments to the central bank (u), and the
lower the other bidding costs (q) and actual liquidity needs ((A + RR ¡ 0:5k0K0)).
Result 3.1: If bidding costs are relatively high (qi ¸ qi;crit), the bank does not take
part in the tender procedures at the central bank, but prefers to cover its total liquidity
needs in the interbank market. If bidding costs are relatively small (qi < qi;crit), the
bank bids for more reserves than it actually needs to cover its own liquidity needs to
place the excess liquidity in the interbank market.
Solving the optimization problem for R1 leads to





q(2q+5z) if qi < qi;crit
k0K0 if qi ¸ qi;crit
: (20)
Equation 20 shows that there may be uneven provisions of required reserves
(R1 ¡ R2 6= 0). If Kt > 0, R1 ¡ R2 corresponds to the upper row of equation
20. It shows that R1 will be the higher compared to R2, the smaller actual liquid-
ity needs A + RR and the smaller already existing reserves k0K0. This is due to
the overlapping maturities of the central bank’s credit transactions combined with
increasing marginal bidding costs. The latter implies that generally the optimal
bidding amount must be the same in both periods. The higher k0K0, the higher is
the amount of already existing reserves in t = 1, so that c. p. R1 is, compared to
R2, the higher the higher k0K0. If u or (A + RR) increase, resp. if qi decreases, Kt
will rise in both periods. Therefore, due to the overlapping maturities, R1 will be
lower than R2 in this case.
The lower row of equation 20, which holds for K1 = K2 = 0, can be interpreted as
follows. If K1 = K2 = 0 and assuming that in this case K0 = 0 too, there will not
be uneven provisions of reserve requirements. In this case the bank covers its total
liquidity needs in the interbank market and due to increasing marginal transaction
costs in that market, an equal provision of required reserves is optimal.
13Result 3.2: There may be uneven provisions of reserve requirements due to over-
lapping maturities of the central bank’s credits combined with increasing marginal
collateralization costs.
Underbidding (overbidding) occurs if the aggregate bidding volume falls short of
(exceeds) the benchmark allotment of the central bank (see section 2). Therefore,
one cannot conclude from the above described bidding behaviour of an isolated bank
whether under- or overbidding occurs. However, the aim of this paper is to show
that expectations of changes in interest rates may induce under- or overbidding.
Therefore, the next section analyzes how the bank’s bidding behaviour changes if
it expects a monetary impulse in form of a decreasing or increasing interest rate on
the central bank’s credits.
3.3 Optimization under Uncertainty
The bank faces uncertainty about future monetary policy and about the other banks’
bidding behaviour. The following equations reﬂect these uncertainties. The expected
interest rate on a central bank’s credit in t = 2, given the information available in
t = 1 is
E[l2jt = 1] = l1 + (1 ¡ w)m (21)
where m 7 0 denotes the monetary impulse and (1¡w), with 0 < w < 1, the prob-
ability that the monetary impulse takes place. The bank does not face uncertainty
about the direction of the monetary impulse. The bank knows whether there may
be a contractionary or an expansionary impulse, i. e. it knows the sign of m. But
it does not know whether the impulse will actually take place.
Furthermore, the bank faces uncertainty about the other bank’s bidding behaviour,
which may lead to under- or overbidding, and about the central bank’s behaviour in
this case. If underbidding occurs and the central bank does not supply the lacking
liquidity, aggregate liquidity shortage will lead to an increase in the interbank market
rate e. If, on the other hand, overbidding occurs and the central bank satisﬁes a
higher bidding volume than the benchmark allotment, aggregate liquidity surplus
will lead to a decrease in the interbank money market rate. These possible decreases
or increases in the money market rate are reﬂected by x(1¡p) with (1¡p) being the
14probability that that there will be scarce or excess liquidity leading to an increase
(x > 0) or decrease (x < 0) in the interbank money market rate. The resulting
expected interbank money market rates given the information available in t = 1 and
in t = 2 are given by
E[e2jt = 1] = E[l2jt = 1] + u + (1 ¡ p)x (22)
and
E[e2jt = 2] = l2 + u + (1 ¡ p)x: (23)

















The Bellman equation for the intra-maintenance period problem is given by
V1 = min
K1;R1
fE [C1(K1;R1) + V2(RK1(K1);R1)]g: (25)
Again, this optimization problem is solved backwards, so that ﬁrst
V2(RK1(K1);R1) = min
K2
fE [k1K1l1 + k2K2l2
+ IB2e2 + Z2 + Q2 ¡ RR(l1 + l2)]jK2 ¸ 0g (26)
is determined. The resulting ﬁrst order condition is











k2(q+z) if qi < q
i;crit
2







2 = z(A + 2RR ¡ R1 ¡ k1K1) + u + (1 ¡ p)x: (29)
15Having determined the optimal value for K2, the optimal bidding behaviour and
the optimal reserve management in the ﬁrst period can be determined.
Optimal Bidding Behaviour and Optimal Reserve Management in the
First Period


















which allow us to determine the optimal values for K1 and R1, and therefore R1¡R2.
























Equation 32 shows that the result of the previous section that the bank bids in both
or no period does not hold any more. If qi < q
i;crit
2 (the bank bids in the second
period) it may be that the bank does not bid in the ﬁrst period. The critical value
for its collateral costs is given by
fq
i;crit
1 jqi < q
i;crit
2 g =
4qz(A + RR ¡ 0:5k0K0) + 4qu + 2q(1 ¡ p)x + 2(q + z)(1 ¡ w)m
2q ¡ z
: (33)
If qi ¸ q
i;crit
2 (the bank does not bid in the second period) it may be that the bank




1 jqi ¸ q
i;crit
2 g = 2z(A + RR ¡ 0:5k0K0) + 2u + (1 ¡ p)x + (1 ¡ w)m: (34)
This change in the bank’s bidding behaviour is due to expected interest rate changes.
If the bank expects the central bank to decrease interest rates ((1¡w)m < 0), it may
16reduce its liquidity costs by bidding in the second period only. If it is still optimal
for the bank to bid in both periods (due to increasing marginal collateralization
costs), the comparison of the upper part of equation 32 with equation 17 shows that
it will bid for less funds compared to a situation in which there are no expectations
of a decrease in the central bank’s interest rate. However, these results only hold if
¡(1 ¡ p)x <
q + z
q
(1 ¡ w)m; (35)
i.e. if the bank does not expect a compensating or overcompensating eﬀect in the
interbank market rate.
If the bank expects the central bank to increase interest rates ((1 ¡ w)m > 0), it
may reduce its liquidity costs and even beneﬁt from placing excess liquidity in the
interbank market in the second period by bidding in the ﬁrst period only, or, if it is
still optimal for the bank to bid in both periods, by bidding in the ﬁrst period for
a higher volume compared to a situation in which there are no expectations of an
increase in the central bank’s interest rate. However, this result too requires that the
bank does not expect a compensating or overcompensating eﬀect in the interbank
market rate. This means that it will bid in the ﬁrst period only if
¡(1 ¡ p)x < (1 ¡ w)m; (36)
and that it will bid for more funds only if 35 holds. This leads us to he following
result.
Result 3.3: Expected future monetary impulses inﬂuence present bidding behaviour.
If there is a continuum of banks diﬀering in their collateralization costs which are
distributed in the interval [qi;min;qi;max] with qi;min < qi;crit < qi;min (see equation
18), more banks bid and a single bank bids for more funds if they expect the central
bank to increase the interest rate and if they do not expect a compensating or over-
compensating eﬀect in the interbank market rate. Consequently, overbidding may
occur. If the banks expect the central bank to decrease the interest rate and if they do
not expect a compensating or overcompensating eﬀect in the interbank market rate,
less banks bid and a single bank bids for less funds. Consequently, underbidding may
occur.
Optimal reserve management leads to
R1 ¡ R2 =
178
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
2
q(2q+5z) ((q + z)qi ¡ qu ¡ qz(A + RR) + q(q + 3z)k0K0)
+ 2
qz(2q+5z) [(q2 + 3qz + 2z2)(1 ¡ w)m + q(q + 2z)(1 ¡ p)x]
if qi < fq
i;crit




2q+5z (qi ¡ u ¡ z(A + RR) + (q + z)k0K0)
+ 2
z(2q+5z) [(q + z)(1 ¡ w)m + q(1 ¡ p)x]
if qi ¸ fq
i;crit









The upper part of equation 37 describes the optimal reserve management of a bank
which bids in both periods, the middle part presents the optimal reserve management
of a bank which bids in the second period only, and the lower part of a bank which
does not bid in the second period.13 Comparing equation 37 with relevant equation
of the previous section 20 shows that expectations of a monetary impulse inﬂuence
the optimal reserve management of a bank.
If fR1 ¡ R2jw;p = 1g ¸ 0 (see equation 20) an expected contractionary monetary
impulse ((1 ¡ w)m > 0) leads to resp. reinforces uneven provisions of required
reserves, unless a compensating or overcompensating eﬀect in the interbank money
market rate is expected. The intuition behind this result is: if a bank expects the
central bank to increase its interest rate, the costs of reserves are higher in the second
period, whereas the beneﬁts are the same in both periods due to the remuneration
of reserves at the average rate.
If fR1¡R2jw;p = 1g < 0 (see equation 20) an expected expansionary ((1¡w)m < 0)
reinforces uneven provisions of required reserves - unless a compensating or over-
compensating eﬀect in the interbank money market rate is expected - because the
costs of reserves are smaller in the second period, but the beneﬁts are the same in
both periods. Consequently, a bank has an incentive to hold more reserves in the
second period.
Analogously, if fR1 ¡ R2jw;p = 1g < 0 an expected contractionary impulse ((1 ¡
w)m < 0) reduces or reinforces (but into the other direction) uneven provisions of
required reserves. The same is true if fR1 ¡ R2jw;p = 1g ¸ 0 and an expansionary
impulse is expected.
Result 3.4: Expectations of interest rate changes inﬂuence the optimal reserve
management of a bank. If a bank expects the central bank to increase its interest rate
13If K2 = 0 the bank’s decision whether it bids in the ﬁrst period does not inﬂuence its optimal
reserve management.
18and if it does not expect a compensating or overcompensating eﬀect in the interbank
market rate, it will increase its reserves in the ﬁrst period and decrease its reserves
in the second period, and vice versa.
3.4 Violation of the Principal of Equal Treatment?
This subsection analyses whether there might a violation of the Eurosystem’s prin-
cipal of equal treatment. For doing so, it is assumed that there are expectations of
interest rate changes ((1 ¡ w);(1 ¡ p) > 0). Furthermore, it assumed that
x ´ ¡4m: (38)
Concerning the euro area, this means that the EONIA may, as a consequence of
the banks’ bidding behaviour, increase to the rate of the marginal lending facility
if banks expect the ECB to lower the rate on its main reﬁnancing operations by
0.25 percentage points, and that the EONIA may decrease to the rate of the de-
posit facility if banks expect the ECB to increase the rate on the main reﬁnancing
operations by 0.25 percentage points. Four scenarios can occur:
I The central bank actually changes its interest rate and there is a strong reac-
tion of the interbank market rate, i.e. l2 = l1 + m and e2 = l2 + u ¡ 4m.
II The central bank does not change its interest rate, but there is a strong reaction
of the interbank market rate, i.e. l2 = l1 and e2 = l2 + u ¡ 4m.
III The central bank actually changes its interest rate, and there is only the ”nor-
mal” reaction of the interbank market rate, i.e.l2 = l1 + m and e2 = l2 + u.
IV The central bank does not change its interest rate, and there is no reaction of
the interbank market rate, i.e.l2 = l1 and e2 = l2 + u.






can be determined. The following derivatives (under the assumption Kt > 0 8t)
show that in the cases I to III, the impact of a possible monetary impulse on total





















mqi = 0 (42)
Furthermore, it is obvious that a bank which does not take part in the tender
procedures (Kt = 0 8t) is aﬀected diﬀerently by a monetary impulse than a bank
for which Kt > 0 is true if there is actually a reaction in the money market in form
of x = ¡4m (scenarios I and III).
Result 3.5: Depending on their marginal collateral costs, banks are aﬀected diﬀer-
ently by possible monetary impulses. This may be a violation of the Eurosystem’s
principal of equal treatment of credit institutions.
4 A Bank’s Demand for Reserves under a Modi-
ﬁed Operational Framework
In section 2, a model explaining a bank’s bidding behaviour and its management
of required reserves has been presented. The model has captured the key elements
of the current operational framework of the Eurosystem. It has been shown that
problems like uneven provisions of required reserves, over- and underbidding and
an unequal impact of monetary impulses on ﬁnancial institutions depending on
their marginal collateral costs may occur. This section shows that under a slightly
modiﬁed operational framework, these problems can be avoided. The operational
framework is modiﬁed in two respects. Firstly, there are no overlapping maturities of
the central bank’s credit operations. Secondly, required reserves are not remunerated
at an average interest rate at the end of the maintenance period, but at the end of
each period t at the rate on the central bank’s credit operations in that period.
Liquidity Costs
Since the maturities of the central bank’s credit operations do not overlap, the stock
of credits borrowed from the central bank is simply given by
RKt = ktKt: (43)
20Total liquidity costs in t include interest payments to the central bank, net interest
payments from transactions in the interbank money market, collateral and transac-
tion costs. They are reduced by the remuneration of required reserves:
Ct(Kt;Rt) = ktKtlt + IBtet + Zt + Qt ¡ Rtlt: (44)
Optimization under Uncertainty
As in the model of the previous section, the bank wants to minimize expected total
liquidity costs across the maintenance period, while keeping average reserves to the

















Optimal Bidding Behaviour and Optimal Reserve Management
Equation 44 shows that there is no intertemporal optimization problem. The ﬁrst





















¡ (1 ¡ p)x = 0: (48)
Equations 46 and 47 make clear that optimal bidding behaviour requires marginal
liquidity costs from borrowing at the central bank and in the interbank money
market to be equal. Equation 48 demands a required reserve management implying
equal marginal costs for reserves in both periods. Solving these equations for K1
and K2, one obtains
K1 =




2z(A + RR) + 2u + x(1 ¡ p) ¡ 2qi
2k2(q + z)
:
21Equation 49 shows that expected future monetary impulses, in form of expected
changes in the rate on the central bank’s credit operations does not inﬂuence the
bank’s bidding behaviour. Consequently, in t = 2 there will not be scarce or excess
liquidity. This implies that p = 1, i. e. the mark-up on the rate in the interbank
market only reﬂects collateral costs. Consequently,
K1 =









i;crit = u + z(A + RR) 8t (51)
and
q
i;crit = u ¡ q(A + RR) 8t: (52)
Result 4.1: The bank’s bidding behaviour does not depend on expected monetary
policy impulses. Only transaction and collateral costs may imply that the bank de-
mands more or less reserves in the tender procedures compared to its actual liquid-
ity needs. Consequently, under- or overbidding due to expectations of interest rate
changes cannot occur.
Solving the ﬁrst order conditions for R1, considering that p = 1, reveals that
R1 = RR = R2: (53)
Result 4.2: There is a smooth provision of reserve requirements.
Assuming there is a monetary impulse, autonomous factors only determine the im-

















Result 4.3: The impact of a monetary impulse m does not depend on a bank’s
marginal collateral costs.
22However, required reserves are another monetary policy instrument. Assuming that



















= 2(u + z(A + RR)): (56)
Result 4.4: The impact of required reserves on a bank depends on its marginal
collateral costs.
5 Summary and Conclusion
Since the launch of the euro in 1999 several tender procedures of the main reﬁnancing
operations have been characterized by signiﬁcant under- and overbidding behaviour
of the ﬁnancial institutions, and several reserve maintenance periods have been char-
acterized by extreme uneven provisions of reserves. By the help of a simple model
capturing the key elements of the current operational framework of the Eurosystem,
this paper analyzes the causes and consequences of this banks’ behaviour and sug-
gests a modiﬁed operational framework for the monetary policy of the Eurosystem,
under which the described extreme behaviour does not occur.
A main result of this paper is that the extreme behaviour of the banks in the
reﬁnancing operations and in the minimum reserve system is due to expectations
of interest rate changes. Expecting an increase in interest rates of future main
reﬁnancing operations within the current reserve maintenance period, banks have
an incentive to underbid, since due to the remuneration of required reserves at the
average, over the maintenance period, of the rate on the reﬁnancing operations,
banks can reduce their liquidity costs by keeping reserves low now, and high after
the monetary impulse. Furthermore, banks may proﬁt from borrowing now at a
low rate from the central bank, and placing the liquidity in the interbank market
at a higher rate after the monetary impulse. A further result of this paper is that
under the current design of the operational framework, banks with diﬀerent marginal
collateral costs may be aﬀected diﬀerently by monetary policy impulses. Since in the
euro area, marginal collateral costs depend on the Member State of the EMU the
23bank is located, the Eurosystem’s guiding principal of equal treatment of ﬁnancial
institutions may be violated.
This paper shows that extreme bidding behaviour and uneven provisions of required
reserves and therefore, the resulting problems can be avoided by a slightly diﬀer-
ent design of the main reﬁnancing operations and of the minimum reserve system,
namely by abolishing ﬁrstly, the overlapping maturities of the main reﬁnancing op-
erations and secondly, the remuneration of required reserves at an average rate. The
paper shows that under this modiﬁed framework, expected interest rate changes do
not inﬂuence a bank’s today’s bidding behaviour, since its optimal behaviour today
has no impact on its future optimal behaviour. (From a technical point of view,
under the current operational framework, banks must solve a dynamic optimization
problem, whereas under the suggested modiﬁed framework a static optimization
problem has to be solved.) Consequently, expectations in interest rate changes can-
not lead to under- or overbidding behaviour and to uneven provisions of required
reserves. Furthermore, the impact on a bank of a monetary impulse in form of in-
terest rate changes does not depend on its marginal collateral costs. Consequently,
the principal of equal treatment of all institutions is not violated in this case.
As elaborated in the introduction, the ECB plans to change its operational frame-
work by, inter alia, abolishing the overlapping maturities of the main reﬁnancing
operations. Considering the result of this paper, this alteration is absolutely sensi-
ble. But concerning the minimum reserve system, where the ECB plans to change
the timing of the maintenance period, so that interest changes would be aligned with
the start of a new maintenance period, the result of this paper suggests a further
alteration. If the minimum reserves were not remunerated at an average rate, but
at the end of the maturity of each main reﬁnancing operation at the rate of this
operation, the ECB would be refrained from making interest rate decisions at the
ﬁrst meeting of the governing council within the maintenance period only. Monetary
policy could be conducted more ﬂexible.
But one problem still remains. Regarding required reserves, ﬁnancial institutions
are still aﬀected diﬀerently due to diﬀerent marginal collateral costs. In this context,
it may be an interesting topic for future research to analyze whether it might be
reasonable to waive the collaterlization of the Eurosystem’s credit transactions.
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